If the image of justice is here rendered back to us, most often with a shock of recognition, at some rare moments, moments miraculous but not necessarily dismissible, it might also come back to us with a difference, a difference that is both less and more than the dream of objective adequation which justice is: less out of forbearance, and more out of hope.
Even as they disagree on crucial questions of theory and perspective, scholars active in the genre of "law and literature" are at one in treating the conjunction of these "major human enterprises" as of considerable significance to the study of law. Employing James Boyd White's description of both law and literature as "cultural practices preoccupied with discourse and the shaping of shared meaning through language," for example, Lawrence Douglas grants literature a vital critical role vis-A-vis law. Literature can "explore law's exclusions." It can instruct law in its limits, challenge law "to extend its discursive possibilities." Demonstrably, it has done so.' Richard Weisberg takes White's observation a long step in a different direction. Pointing to the analogous forms of law and literature, to the close relationship between "law's manner of recreating and discussing reality" and "what storytellers themselves are in the business of doing," Weisberg represents literature ("stories and poems") not only as a vital source of knowledge about law, and of critical insight into law, but also as itself a source of law that is "richer and certainly more accessible than those others in legal philosophy that have dominated jurisprudence for many years." ' Literature furnishes law the very means to imagine.' Brook Thomas, on the other hand, has warned against any facile "merger" of law and literature. Using Althusserian language, each is "relatively autonomous,"
both of context and of the other. "Although both are ultimately related to the period's modes of production and reproduction of social structures, each develops according to a logic of its own." 4 In their relatively uncoupled structural relationship, however, Thomas (like Douglas) identifies a crucial critical potential in literature vis-A-vis law. "Literature's distance from the direct mode of governance accounts for its capacity to contest a period's dominant legal ideology... even literature that does not directly engage legal issues can occupy a potential space in which it is informed by a different set of ideological assumptions from those that inform law." Law is a social text rhetorically legitimized to respond "to its historical situation" by addressing conflicts, maintaining order. Whether imaginatively or reflectively, literature (another social text) can hack into that historical situation and dispute it, redefine it, criticize it, offer distinct solutions to conflicts or distinct means to maintain order.
5
The varied positions taken by leading law and literature scholars on the relationship pertaining between their intersecting subjects have been in many cases deeply informed by extensive historical study.' None of these scholars, however, would identify herself or himself as a historian per se. What
Tomlins
• Revolutionary Justice In Brecht, Conrad, and Blake of those scholars who do so identify? In the hands of historians of law, it is noticeable that literature has been confined to a somewhat more restricted sphere of application. Legal historians mine works of literature in search of images, descriptions, and representations of law and legal events in historical or historical-analogical contexts. The works that excite most interest are those explicitly inflected by law: Eumenides, Bartleby the Scrivener, White Jacket, Billy Budd, Bleak House, The Trial, To Kill a Mockingbird, and so forth. 7 The questions asked of them treat literature as a locale at which an intersection of culture and law occurs that the historian can access as evidence for use in writing the history of law, or (more expansively) that she or he can treat as in itself an appropriate subject for the history of law: How, in this source, is law or legality represented? How is law enacted? What is law's context? What meaning does this author ascribe to law in this place and time? How do meanings change over time? The questions asked and the answers sought are framed by history's default conventions: time is linear and sequential; past and present are discontinuous; facticity and imagination are distinct; the recovery of meaning is appropriately mediated by the scholar's reflective expertise. 8 Literature then comes to us wrapped in the method of history. If we reverse this order of things and make history (particularly legal history) and how we do it the subject for inquiry, we find ourselves on a terrain of debate more closely resembling that occupied by law and literature scholars. What range of possibility exists in the relationship between literature and legal history? What can literature as a form tell historians about "history" as we currently practice it? How might an inspection of literature, not as source or subject but as medium, change the practice of legal historians? In this essay I consider some possibilities through an examination of how time and justice, and in particular the time of justice, are presented in three literary works. 9 To a degree, I am borrowing here from two recently published essays in which I have examined the same works, although not with my current purposes in mind." The three are Threepenny Novel, by Bertolt Brecht;
Heart of Darkness, by Joseph Conrad; and the poem "London" from Songs of Innocence and Experience by William Blake."
My principal interlocutor in this exercise is the literary critic and philosopher of history, Walter Benjamin (1892 Benjamin ( -1940 . Indeed, this essay is one fragment in a long slow process of trying to tease out of Benjamin's remarkable and extensive corpus of writing what I think of as his jurisprudence of revolution. 2 In my view, one can detect in Benjamin a historical and materialist jurisprudence that is quite unlike anything we generally include in the category "Marxist theories of law"-the pioneering "capital logic" theorizing of Evgeny Pashukanis, for example, or the later efforts of Althusserian structuralists like Nikos Poulantzas. " Here I experiment with just one element of that exercise in "teasing out": how literature as medium reciprocates the historical materialist strategy that Benjamin calls "constellation," and whether it does so in ways that are at all suggestive of how legal historians in turn might employ that strategy in approaching questions of time and justice.
As I see it, Benjamin developed the concept of constellation, which he also earlier called convolution, in the course of a multifaceted intellectual encounter with Leibniz. 4 In his translator's foreword to Gilles Deleuze's famous disquisition upon Leibniz, The Fold, Tom Conley calls Leibniz "the first great philosopher of the pleat, of curves and twisting surfaces."" Convolution expresses time precisely in this fashion: folded, coiled, twisted; time not straight and sequential, endless extension, but sinuous, wound back on itself. Time, that is, expressed in the way that life itself is lived and recalled. 6 Benjamin gives voice to the idea of convolution in his 1929 essay on Marcel Proust,'" whose massive memoir, 4la Recherche du Temps Perdu," 8 is famously launched from a fold of pastry-a "petite madeleine" 9 -that is simultaneously a fold of time. Of that fold, Proust writes
When from a long-distant past nothing subsists, after the people are dead, after the things are broken and scattered, still, alone, more fragile, but with more vitality, more unsubstantial, more persistent, more faithful, the smell and taste of things remain poised a long time, like souls, ready to remind us, waiting and hoping for their moment, amid the ruins of all the rest; and bear unfaltering, in the tiny and almost impalpable drop of their essence, the vast structure of recollection.'
In Proust, as in Benjamin, the concept of history expresses the past in the present, not locked behind a historical positivist's czesura as a subject isolated for scientific observation and conscious reflection, or as Gordon Wood would have it "reconstruction," ' but "waiting and hoping," immanent in the narration of an actualizing recollection.' Or as Benjamin puts it in his climactic
Theses on the Philosophy of History,' "to articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it 'the way it really was.' It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger," at "the instant when it can be recognized.'
' 4 lea Constellation expresses this "flashing up" of the past in the present and its recognition, and makes of it a means to penetrate and countermand historicist causality. 25 It is central to Benjamin's jurisprudence of revolution, as these three extracts from the Theses illustrate:
Thesis 14: History is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogenous empty time, but time filled by the presence of the now.
Thesis A: No fact that is a cause is for that very reason historical. It becomes historical posthumously, as it were, through events that may be separated from it by thousands of years. A historian who takes this as his point of departure stops telling the sequence of events like the beads of a rosary. Instead he grasps the constellation which his own era has formed with a definite earlier one.
Thesis 15: The awareness that they are about to make the continuum of history explode is characteristic of the revolutionary classes at the moment of their action.
So understood, the present moment ceases to be merely an allotted moment of transition to the next moment in a continuum, and so on ad infinitum, but always potentially a moment for itself, of time out of joint; as Benjamin puts it, "a Messianic cessation of happening, or put differently, a revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past." 2 Interruption-cessation-is central to Benjamin's critique of the conventions of historical practice. "A historical materialist cannot do without the notion of a present that is not a transition, but in which time stands still and has come to a stop." 27 It is also the central concept in his jurisprudence of revolution. His well-known meditation upon Angelus Novus, for example, represents "the angel of history" contemplating not "a chain of events" but "one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet." The angel "would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed" but he cannot, for he is caught "in a storm.. . blowing from Paradise that ... propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. ' For the beginnings of the answer one must turn back to Benjamin's "Critique of Violence" (192) . 29 "Critique of Violence" was in crucial aspects a meditation upon George Sorel's exposition of revolutionary syndicalism,
Reflections on Violence.
3 " In Reflections, Sorel argued that the means to interruption was the revolutionary violence of the general strike, the final uprising of the proletariat for itself and for no other.
3 ' As a Marxist and a revolutionary,
Benjamin's own conception of revolutionary justice (and of historical materialism) would embrace the always potentially recurrent appearance of a revolutionary proletariat in action. 32 Still, for him the effects for men of their own revolutionary violence were not clear cut. 33 Like Sorel, "Benjamin wants to conceive of a finality, a justice of ends, no longer tied to the possibility of law." 34 But all species of violence (save only one) were implicated in the making and preserving of the storm of progress and law that was to be interrupted. Law's foundation lay in the mythical violence visited by the gods upon humanity, which is to say that the positing of law is in its fundamental principle "a power (Macht), a force, a positing of authority," originating then in a moment of "privilege ... prerogative," of sovereignty, before which no justice, neither of retribution nor distribution, takes place, but only expiationthe seeking of forgiveness, the making of atonement. The possibility of interruption hence lay only in something entirely distinct, divine violence, the violence of God, opposite in every respect to the mythic violence of the gods, which "instead of founding law ... destroys it."
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It would be on the idea of a Messianic cessation that Benjamin founded the tie between the essence of revolution and the idea of absolute judgment, utter transformation, and subjugation of prior injustice.' To achieve the tie, Benjamin jerked profane temporality into the realm of sacred time. But he did not leave it there. 37 Thus at the end of "Critique of Violence," Benjamin can write that "on the suspension of law with all the forces on which it depends as they depend upon it, finally therefore on the abolition of state power, a new What, one might ask, has all this to do with Brecht, Conrad, and Blake? To contend for their salience, I will proceed in order. The exercise itself is an attempt at constellation: that is, an attempt to seize hold of the conjunction that I will argue obtains among them and complete it by folding our "now" into its midst. This is assuredly and obviously not an exercise in what I have called historical positivism-in explaining these subjects and their observations by assigning them their appropriate contextual locations in a temporal continuum. Rather, it is to conjoin them, and in doing so offer a glimpse of what may concretely be found in Benjamin's philosophy of history; and to offer us-who are also conjoined-the chance to experience something of the stir that Proust says unlocked his mind when he dunked his madeleine in a cup of tea and brought "the whole of Combray and of its surroundings" into being." In this conjunction of texts, in short, there exists an opportunity to "hack in" to historical time and reshape it on Benjamin's terms so that we can, in turn, imagine historical incarnations of revolutionary justice. The agreement produced by their struggle establishes the legal order that will Against the Company and its expertises of "efficiency," of "pity and science and progress," the rebellious Kurtz stands for justice. Kurtz makes the claim himself-"I want no more than justice";" he marshals a sovereign's violence in his claim's service; and his last words, whispered "during that supreme moment of complete knowledge" before death, deliver absolute judgment.
6 " This is not of course the justice of liberal political imagination-the justice that is achieved by marshaling law, indistinguishable from the Company's "progress." It is justice akin to Fewkoombey's dream of vengeance, to Benjamin's imagination of justice in its revolutionary incarnation as divine retribution delivered at a Messianic moment. And just as Fewkoombey imagines judgment deliverable only at a moment out of scientific sequential time, of time out of joint, in a dream, so Kurtz's judgment, "all the wisdom, and all truth, and all sincerity," is also delivered at just such a moment, "compressed into that inappreciable moment of time in which we step over the threshold of the invisible." 67 And like Fewkoombey, it is betrayed.' Indeed, Marlow's story, which in its entirety remorselessly delivers judgment (as much on himself, for his betrayal, as on what he recounts), is told as if it were itself a dream, or at least dreamlike; a recollection that begins and ends in darkness. It sparks suddenly into existence out of nothing, in a moment outside historical time, a fold. 69 We know this from the very moment Marlow abruptly begins, because in the instant of beginning he declares the fold, the convolution, in a tangle of spaces and temporalities-of London and Africa, of rivers, of long before and eternity and the moment of now, all crystallized as a single constellation: "'And this also,' said Marlow suddenly, 'has been one of the dark places of the earth."' His disembodied voice comes out of nowhere. What does he mean? "'I was thinking"' he goes on, "'of very old times, when the Romans first came here, nineteen hundred years ago-the other day.... Light came out of this river since-you say Knights? Yes; but it is like a running blaze on a plain, like a flash of lightning in the clouds. We live in the flicker-may it last as long as the old earth keeps rolling! But darkness was here yesterday."' And so forth. We encounter William Blake's London at its fevered revolutionary climacteric of the early I79os. London was fevered by Jacobin "rights talk," fed by the Enlightenment, but Blake was no Enlightenment scion. Though he hated state and church as much as any Jacobin, "it did not follow," says E. P.
Thompson in Witness Against the Beast-his last book and perhaps the book truest to himself-"that humanity's redemption ... could be effected by a political reorganization of these institutions alone. There must be some utopian leap, some human rebirth, from Mystery to renewed imaginative life. 72 Walter Benjamin's conception of revolution very deliberately reached for the sacred temporality of divine violence, of judgment and redemption, for its own "utopian leap." 73 As he put it, in the first of the Theses: "[Histori-
cal materialism] can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the services of theology, which today, as we know, is wizened and has to keep out of sight"; in the last, that "every second of time" is "the strait-gate through which the Messiah might enter. '74 Blake's theology--eschatological and antinomianwas of course neither wizened nor out of sight, but loomed large in his every depiction of humanity. Thompson writes of Blake's poem "London" that it is "instantly available," that it requires no interpreter. "The images are selfsufficient within the terms of the poem's own development. Every reader can, without the help of a critic, see London simultaneously as Blake's own city, as an image of the state of English society and as an image of the human condition. The London of Blake's poem was Patrick Colquhoun's London-the London, that is, of the Police of the Metropolis (1796), the world's greatest commercial city, the riverine heart of an imperial political economy, inhabited by a laboring population disciplined by the sciences of magistracy. This London, Blake's "London," is Hell on Earth. Everything---every inhabitant, every street, the river itself, the entire city-has been "charter'd"; that is, contracted out, hired, expropriated, absorbed into an unrelieved commerce in things and people. Hire leaves its corruptions evident in every face and activity, heard in every voice. The mark on every face is the mark of the Beast. We are in the realm of the Antichrist. Humanity is fallen, laid low by the charters and bans of the "blackning" church and blood-drenched king, clasped all in mind-forg'd manacles, from barrow boy to prostitute. 77 Blake's judgment flayed every fragment of Colquhoun's London. Still, he ends not in despair but with a curse, a snarl of anger. It is the city that has been sold out, not the city that has done the selling. For always alongside London as Hell on Earth, Blake glimpses another city, Jerusalem, immanent, the spectral London that "could also be the millennial city, of that time when the moral and self-righteous law should be overthrown, and the Multitude return to Unity.
' 7 ' Blake's only church was the Church of the New Jerusalem; his spectral London was humanity redeemed; its time, of course, was Messianic.
The unity to which the multitude returned, at the end, was that of release from the order of the profane, the unity of the City of God.
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END
At the outset, I indicated my purpose would not be to assign these subjects to their appropriate locations in a temporal continuum-to engage in explanation by temporal contextualization. Conventionally, we do this at the beginning; we create a "frame" for our narratives of people and events that establishes an explanatory context for what will follow. Subjects then become illustrations of an explanation. In part, this essay is an exercise in critique of doing exactly that.
So, really, I should simply leave it at that. But to do so would be irresponsible. After all, the essay began by wondering what literature could teach contemporary legal historians about history as a practice. It has examined time and justice to ask what literature as a form can do that history cannot, and whether that knowledge might change the practice of history. I chose Benjamin as guide because he stands so precisely at the exact locus of this intersection: literary critic, philosopher of history. It seems appropriate, therefore, to try to sketch my own standpoint in the literal constellation of place and time and subjects that I have discussed, so as to bring out what I see lying there so that it can in turn be discussed, criticized, or ignored.
In an article published a few years ago, Silvana Caporaletti (of the University of Lecce, Italy) reads in the literature of the early twentieth century a reaction against the later nineteenth century's triumphant epoch of scientific explanation, whose crowning achievements we might say pronounced the death of life. The enunciation of the second law of thermodynamics-that .the entropy of an isolated system not in equilibrium will tend to increase over time"-seemed to mean the irreversible death of the universe; Darwinian evolution seemed to mean the death of God; the apparent subjection of human life to "impersonal laws.., utterly indifferent to its presence" seemed to mean the death of spirit and will. In Time andFree Will(i88 9 ) Bergson contrasted "scientific" time-linear and sequential, mere extension, not a dimension of reality at all but the artifact of a need to measure-with what he called "dure rdelle," interior and subjectively experienced time, "a spherical dimension where past, present and future coexist and continually interact, shaping each other." A few years later Bergson's better known Matter and Memory ( 896) drew a similar distinction between conscious memory-active reflection-and "mimoire rielle," by which Bergson meant "unconscious memory where past events are preserved in their original intensity." 82 Caporaletti's particular interest lies in temporality in E.
M. Forster and James Joyce, but as she notes, Bergson's ideas about time and memory informed the passions of many of their contemporaries-T. S. Eliot, for one, and obviously Proust, with whom we began. Ananias dead." Our talk of justice is of justice as an outcome of positive law, a creature of its rules and procedures, a justice of "fairness" or "efficiency" or "balance" produced by technique. These are but Earth-bound remnants, says
Berkowitz, pallid residues of the real thing. 84 Berkowitz sees legal modernity, from which justice flees, by which its residual has been appropriated, as in origin an Enlightenment project. Legal modernity is-to quote his book's wry title-"the gift of science." This "periodization" means that now we can squeeze Blake under the same explanatory umbrella as the others, for the force beating on Blake's antinomian faith was, of course, the mechanistic epistemology of Newton and Locke. 85 Still, can this historical temporalization, this context-the rise of "science" Shakespeare repeats him, word for word, in Titus Andronicus, a play precisely about law and justice. "She's gone," says Titus, in Act IV; "she's fled." Justice returns in Act V, though not for long. 87 My point is that justice's time cannot be "placed," it does not flee and return on causal cue. Justice's time is time "out of joint," as Brecht, Conrad, and Blake all had it, and as Benjamin knew in making revolutionary justice Messianic.
One final point. Justice, says Berkowitz, is transcendent, ineffable. It "resists precisely what modern man most craves: definition." I agree. (It is that craving that will lead some to think it bizarre that-for example-I make Kurtz stand for justice in Heart ofDarkness, when what Kurtz stands for seems so utterly unlike anything that we would call justice today.) But Berkowitz fails to follow his own advice; he penetrates the ineffable, and defines justice.
Justice is that familiar "higher good"; it is human dignity, nobility, the acme of morality, and ethical perfection. 88 Indeed that may well be. It is also ven- Benjamin's conception of revolutionary justice is embedded in the theology of messianic expiation and redemption. The more of Marx he read, the more he saw the same in Marx.
Wai Chee Dimock attributes to Marx a conception of justice as "objective adequation" (recuperation) grounded on a materialist epistemology (i.e., "the translatability of the economic into the legal, the political and the social") that is precisely the expression of classless society achieved teleologically through the proletariat's full-grown achievement of metonymic "completion"-integral wholeness, revolutionary transformation from part into whole-as the ultimate actualization of all humanity, wherefrom the just society emerges in the form of the classic slogan "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." Dimock, supra note i, at 17-74.
Benjamin saw matters differently. There was nothing teleological in Marx's conception of classless society or its emergence. Rather, "In the idea of classless society, Marx secularized the idea of messianic time." It was German social democracy (the SDP) that had converted classless society from an idea to an ideal, and, by defining it in the process as "an infinite task," had substituted a neo-Kantian for a messianic meaning. Once this had happened, -once the classless society had been defined as an infinite task," historicist time, "empty and homogenous," had taken over from the messianic: "Time was transformed into an anteroom, so to speak, in which one could wait for the emergence of the revolutionary situation with more or less equanimity." Teleology, that is, lay in the philosophy of the SDP, not in Marxist materialism. In the latter, "there is not a moment that would not carry with it its Three basic concepts can be identified in Marx's work, and its entire theoretical armature can be seen as an attempt to weld these three concepts together. They are the class struggle of the proletariat, the course of historical development (progress), and the classless society. The structure of Marx's basic idea is as follows: Through a series of class struggles, humanity attains to a classless society in the course of historical development. But classless society is not to be conceived as the endpoint of historical development.
This was the erroneous conception from which "Marx's epigones" derived (among other things) their teleological notion "of 'the revolutionary situation,' which, as we know, has always refused to arrive." Rescue, Benjamin concluded, required that "a genuinely messianic face ... be restored to the concept of classless society ... in the interest of furthering the revolutionary politics of the proletariat itself" and, one might add, in the interests of furthering a conception of revolutionary justice that was other than "objective adequation." Redemption was not recuperation. "The Messiah comes not only as redeemer, he comes as the subduer of Antichrist." Revolutionary justice was expiatory. What is at stake is not to portray literary works in the context of their age, but to represent the age that perceives them-our age-in the age during which they arose. It is this that makes literature into an organon of history; and to achieve this, and not to reduce literature to the material of history is the task of the literary historian. at xi) to underline the contingency of meaning attributable to legal and literary texts across time (if, in Robert Gordon's words "the meanings of words and actions are to some degree dependent on the particular social and historical conditions in which they occur"-Robert W. Gordon, "Historicism in Legal Scholarship," 90 Yale LawJournal 1017 n.i (1981)-that dependence must necessarily disturb the timelessness, hence consistency of meaning that orthodoxies attribute to texts). Both found opportunities and openness to exist within contingency. Both then pushed further to a totalized contingencyindeterminacy-that dissolved the separation of text from context. Critical legal history attacked every prior attempt to stabilize historical context and its relationship to law as "evolutionary functionalism" (Robert W. Gordon, "Critical Legal Histories," 36 Stanford Law Review 1-2 (1984) ). Critical analysis of doctrine exposed, at least to its own satisfaction, not only the absence of any determining relationship between law (particular rules and processes) and society (particular social practices, structures, or other discourses), or vice versa, but also the absence of any determinate meaning attributable to the rule considered on its own terms, stemming from its own internal contradictions (Tomlins, "How Autonomous Is Law," supra note 13, at 58). In literature, similarly, "new historicism" held there could be "no predetermined context in which we can place a text in order to understand it historically" (Thomas, The New Hstoricism, supra note 24, at 38-39, 44-45; but see Dimock, supra note i, at 77-79). In the totalized contingency at which both new historicisms arrived, one can discover no longer any trace of explanation-which was, after all, what both set out to attempt-but instead an aesthetic of "complexity"-an infinite plurality of outcomes that will enable one to provide whatever history for one's text one could desire. Complexity's emphases-complete contingency, perpetual contest, and continuous renegotiation-are at one with the indeterminacy thesis, which is perhaps why Gordon finds promise in "virtually all history" when applied to law. See Robert W. One might nevertheless argue that the new historicisms' totalized contingency reproduces Benjamin's resistance to "completion." Indeed, incompletion was central to Benjamin's conception of history. "Only a redeemed mankind receives the fullness of its past." "Theses," supra note 12, at Thesis 3. For this he was criticized by Max Horkheimer, who wrote in 1937, "[T]he determination of incompleteness is idealistic, if completeness is not comprised within it. Past injustice has occurred and is completed. The slain are really slain ... If one takes the lack of closure entirely seriously, one has to believe in the Last Judgment." Arcades Project, supra note 13, at 471 N8,i. Yet the slain, though really slain, are not thereby rendered no more, but find ways to seek our attention, waiting and hoping for the moment of recognition, of recollection, the shattering constellation of then and now in one "enormous abridgement" ("Theses," supra note i, at Thesis 18) that was the product of remembrance. Here, then, was Benjamin's answer to Horkheimer: "remembrance ... forbids us to conceive of history as fundamentally a-theological." Last Judgment indeed, when the past became for the first and only time citable in all its moments, and history would end. But this is also the answer to the question whether Benjamin's incompletion has been reproduced in the directionless contingency of the new historicisms. In my view it has not. Just as we cannot read redemption in Benjamin's philosophy of history other than as a revolutionary act, we cannot read incompletion in that philosophy except through its end in revolution. (192o-21) ). The original title may be interpreted as differing from the implications of the English translation in two respects: First, and less important, Zur Kritik der Gewalt might better be rendered as "On the Critique of..." or "Toward a Critique of.... This reinforces the correct sense of Kritik/Crtique, which is evaluative rather than condemnatory. Benjamin is undertaking a critique and simultaneously exploring how the critique may be undertaken. His text is perhaps more experimental than the English title implies. Second, and more important, Gewalt can also be translated as "legitimate power" or "authority" or "public force." What is translated as "violence" thus can mean state action to exert pressure, threaten, or coerce in the name of authority, rather than physical onslaught and destruction from any source. See generally Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law:
The Mystical Foundation of Authority," in Acts of Religion/Jacques Derrida, ed. Gil Anidjar (New 33. Note, for example, the concern expressed in Thesis 14 at the necessity of achieving a revolutionary consciousness that did not mimic the past but rather grew out of a dialectical constellation of past and Grooch... you are an old burglar. Your profession is burglary. I wouldn't think of suggesting that your profession, in itself, is out of date. That would be going too far. Only in its form, G rooch, does it lag behind the times. You are an artisan, a hack, and that's all there is to it. That class is on the wane-you can't deny that. What is a pick-lock compared to a debenture share?
What is the burgling of a bank compared to the founding of a bank? What, my dear Grooch, is the murder of a man compared to the employment of a man? Take an example. A few years ago we stole a whole street of wooden blocks; we dug the blocks out, loaded them on to a cart and drove away with them. We thought we had done something wonderful. In reality we had only made ourselves unnecessary work and run an unnecessary risk. Shortly afterwards I heard that one only has to be a town councilor in order to be able to arrange the distribution of contracts oneself. Then one gets the contract for such and such a street and also several years' guaranteed profits without running any risks at all ... Nowadays a man must work within the law; it's just as much fun! . . .Brute force is out of date. Why send out murderers when one can employ bailiffs? We must build up, not pull down; that is, we must build up for profit. open not to the reflective intelligence of purposeful remembering, the activity from which we derive our historicist philosophy of history and time, but to the stir to the mind of involuntary recollection.
Actualization is alien to our modern reflective intellect, so we suppress it. So completely does actualiza- Once, I remember, we came upon a man-of-war anchored off the coast. There wasn't even a shed there, and she was shelling the bush. It appears the French had one of their wars going on thereabouts. Her ensign dropped limp like a rag; the muzzles of the long six-inch guns stuck out all over the low hull; the greasy, slimy swell swung her up lazily and let her down, swaying her thin masts. In the empty immensity of earth, sky, and water, there she was, incomprehensible, firing into a continent. Pop, would go one of the six-inch guns; a small flame would dart and vanish, a little white smoke would disappear, a tiny projectile would give a feeble screech-and nothing happened. Nothing could happen. There was a touch of insanity in the proceeding, a sense of lugubrious drollery in the sight; and it was not dissipated by somebody on board assuring me earnestly there was a camp of natives-he called them enemies!-hidden out of sight somewhere.
African laborers, he says, two pages later, "could by no stretch of imagination be called enemies. He had summed up-he had judged. "The horror!" He was a remarkable man. After all, this was the expression of some sort of belief; it had candour, it had conviction, it had a vibrating note of revolt in its whisper, it had the appalling face of a glimpsed truth-the strange commingling of desire and hate. And it is not my own extremity I remember best-a vision of greyness without form filled with physical pain, and a careless contempt for the evanescence of all things-even of this pain itself. No! It is his extremity that I seem to have lived through.
True, lie had made that last stride, he had stepped over the edge, while I had been permitted to draw back my hesitating foot. And perhaps in this is the whole difference; perhaps all the wisdom, and all truth, and all sincerity, are just compressed into that inappreciable moment of time in which we step over the threshold of the invisible. Perhaps! I like to think my summing-up would not have been a word of careless contempt. Better his cry-much better. It was an affirmation, a moral victory paid for by innumerable defeats, by abominable terrors, by abominable satisfactions. But it was a victory! That is why I have remained loyal to Kurtz to the last, and even beyond, when a long time after I heard once more, not his own voice, but the echo of his magnificent eloquence thrown to me from a soul as translucently pure as a cliff of crystal.
67.
Id. at 149. Benjamin is famous for his observation, " [T] here is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism." "Theses," supra note 12, at Thesis 7. Why not read Kurtz-apparent emissary of civilization turned barbarian-in this light? Why make him a voice of justice?
First, one must consider the valence of Benjamin's observation. An earlier formulation helps: "Barbarism lurks in the very concept of culture--as the concept ofa fund of values which is considered independent, not indeed, of the production process in which these values originated, but of the one in which they survive." Arcades Project, supra note 13, 467-68 N 5 a, 7 . In Heart of Darkness the values considered "independent of the production process in which they survive" (the harvesting ofivory)-are precisely those (pity, science, and progress) that the civilized, educated Kurtz had originally embraced and then, as barbarian, scorned. "All Europe contributed to the making of Kurtz" (Conrad, supra note ii, at 122-23). Europe's values were nowhere so deeply embedded as in the literal "document ofcivilization" that actually figures in Conrad's text, the report Kurtz wrote for the International Society for the Suppression of Savage Customs which "made him" so to speak "before his-let us say-nerves, went wrong." The report, says Marlow, "was a beautiful piece of writing." It held "that we whites, from the point of development we had arrived at, 'must necessarily appear to them [savages] in the nature of supernatural beings-we approach them with the might of a deity,' and so on, and so on. 'By the simple exercise of our will we can exert a power for good practically unbounded,' etc., etc.... It gave me the notion of an exotic Immensity ruled by an august Benevolence." But "a kind of note at the foot of the last page, scrawled evidently much later, in an unsteady hand, may be regarded as the exposition of a method. It was very simple, and at the end of that moving appeal to every altruistic sentiment it blazed at you, luminous and terrifying, like a flash of lightning in a serene sky: 'Exterminate all the brutes!"' (Id. at 123).
Second and relatedly, one must consider the duality of "barbarism" in Benjamin's writing. Note, Kurtz as an exemplification of the "new, positive concept of barbarism," and indeed of the inexorable "great creative spirit" who, starting from scratch, begins by clearing a tabula rasa. It is on that tabula rasa, I argue, that Kurtz inscribes judgment, and is therefore a voice of justice.
68. Conrad, supra note i i, at 17. Marlow is the betrayer, substituting love for horror:
It seemed to me that the house would collapse before I could escape, that the heavens would fall upon my head. But nothing happened. The heavens do not fall for such a trifle. Would they have fallen, I wonder, if I had rendered Kurtz that justice which was his due? Hadn't he said he wanted only justice? But I couldn't. I could not tell her. It would have been too dark-too dark altogether.
And it is folded within itself (id. at 103):
You lost your way on that river as you would in a desert, and butted all day long against shoals, trying to find the channel, till you thought yourself bewitched and cut off for ever from everything you had known once-somewhere-far away-in another existence perhaps. There were moments when one's past came back to one, as it will sometimes when you have not a moment to spare for yourself; but it came in the shape of an unrestful and noisy dream, remembered with wonder amongst the overwhelming realities of this strange world of plants, and water, and silence. And this stillness of life did not in the least resemble a peace. It was the stillness of an implacable force brooding over an inscrutable intention. It looked at you with a vengeful aspect. I got used to it afterwards; I did not see it any more; I had no time. I had to keep guessing at the channel; I had to discern, mostly by inspiration, the signs of hidden banks; I watched for sunken stones; I was learning to clap my teeth smartly before my heart flew out, when I shaved by a fluke some infernal sly old snag that would have ripped the life out of the tin-pot steamboat and drowned all the pilgrims; I had to keep a lookout for the signs of dead wood we could cut up in the night for next day's steaming. When you have to attend to things of that sort, to the mere incidents of the surface, the reality-the reality, I tell you-fades.
The inner truth is hidden-luckily, luckily. But I felt it all the same; I felt often its mysterious stillness watching me.
70.
Id. at 67,68. How does Conrad ask us to understand Marlow's tale? Essentially, in my view, in the same way Benjamin asks us to understand history, which is to say, very differently from the understanding suggested by the temporality of historicism. First Benjamin ("Theses," supra note 12, at Thesis 17):
Historicism rightly culminates in universal history. Materialistic historiography differs from it as to method more clearly than from any other kind. Universal history has no theoretical armature. Its method is additive; it musters a mass of data to fill the homogeneous, empty time.
Materialistic historiography, on the other hand, is based on a constructive principle. Thinking involves not only the flow of thoughts, but their arrest as well. Where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a shock, by which it crystallizes into a monad. A historical materialist approaches a historical subject only where he encounters it as a monad. In this structure he recognizes the sign of a Messianic cessation of happening, or, put differently, a revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past. He takes cognizance of it in order to blast a specific era out of the homogenous course of historyblasting a specific life out of the era or a specific work out of the lifework. As a result of this method the lifework is preserved in this work and at the same time canceled*; in the lifework, the era; and in the era, the entire course of history. The nourishing fruit of the historically understood contains time as a precious but tasteless seed.
*(Here Benjamin uses the verb auflheben in its threefold meaning-to preserve, to elevate, to cancelwhich for Hegelian dialectics provides the term auJhebung (in English sublation) meaning simultaneous preservation and alteration (uplifting) arising from the encounter of contradictory elements, here through the process of "blasting out.") Now Conrad, supra note i i, at 68:
The yarns of seamen have a direct simplicity, the whole meaning of which lies within the shell of a cracked nut. But Marlow was not typical (if his propensity to spin yarns be excepted), and to him the meaning of an episode was not inside like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale which brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze, in the likeness of one of these misty halos that sometimes are made visible by the spectral illumination of moonshine.
